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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 John Doe, D.O., a medical doctor, and ABC Entity, (the 
“Corporation” or “Medical Practice”), (together, 
“Appellants”), appeal the District Court’s order holding the 
Corporation in contempt for noncompliance with a grand jury 
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subpoena directing its custodian of records to produce certain 
documents.  Doe claims that despite serving as the 
Corporation’s custodian, as the sole owner and employee, he is 
entitled to refuse to comply with the subpoena in accordance 
with his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  
Appellants also argue that compliance is unnecessary because 
the subpoena is impermissibly overbroad and should be 
quashed.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order. 
 
I. 
 
 In 1973, Doe, the only medical practitioner in his 
practice, organized his medical practice as ABC Entity, a 
“professional association,” which is a type of corporation 
doctors are permitted to form under New Jersey law.  Since its 
creation, Doe has operated his practice through that corporate 
entity.  As of October 2011, the Corporation employed a staff 
of six. 
 
 The original target entity (the “OTE”) was a clinical 
blood laboratory in New Jersey.  From 2006 through 2013, 
this entity used various methods to bribe numerous physicians 
to refer their patients to it for blood testing.  The Government 
alleges that Doe entered into an illicit agreement with the 
OTE, whereby it paid him monetary bribes in exchange for 
referring his patients to it for blood testing. 
 
 In April 2013, a grand jury subpoena was served on the 
custodian of records for the Corporation, directing it to turn 
over various documents, including records of patients referred 
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to the OTE, lease and consulting agreements, checks received 
by it for reasons other than patient treatment, correspondence 
regarding its use of the OTE as a blood-testing provider, 
correspondence with specified individuals and entities, and 
basic corporate records.  In December of 2013, Doe, as 
custodian, moved to quash the subpoena.  The Government 
opposed the motion, and the District Court denied the motion 
to quash, concluding (1) that Supreme Court precedent 
indicated that corporations may not assert a Fifth Amendment 
privilege, and (2) that the subpoena was not overbroad in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 Following the District Court’s denial of his request to 
quash, Doe refused to let his corporation comply and the 
Government moved to compel it to do so.  The District Court 
granted that motion.  The Corporation persisted in its refusal to 
comply and the District Court found it in civil contempt and 
ordered it to pay a $2,000 per day sanction.  The Court, 
however, agreed to stay execution of the fine pending an 
expedited appeal before this court. 
 
 Just days before filing their opening brief, Appellants 
informed the Government that the Corporation had fallen on 
hard financial times and fired all of its employees other than 
Doe.  In their place, it hired independent contractors to assist 
Doe in operating his medical practice.  Among other duties, 
the independent contractors were tasked with “[m]aint[aining] 
accurate and complete medical records, kept in accordance 
with HIPAA and Patient Privacy standards,” and assisting with 
billing practices.  However, before the Government filed its 
response, due to its discovery of a potential procedural defect, 
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we summarily vacated the contempt order and remanded the 
matter to the District Court. 
 
 The Government then filed a new subpoena that 
repeated the demands made in the first subpoena.  As the 
government indicates, the “new subpoena was intended to 
place the parties in the same position as the previous 
subpoena,” and the request in the new subpoena was limited to 
documents that had been subject to the initial subpoena.  
(Gov’t Br. at 9.)  The Government filed a motion to compel, 
Appellants opposed, and the District Court held another 
hearing, albeit a less extensive one given that the parties 
agreed not to rehash the arguments they had made prior.  The 
District Court did, however, address Appellants’ new 
submission regarding the fact that the Corporation no longer 
employed anyone other than Doe and was now operated by 
independent contractors. 
 
 Despite this factual development, the District Court 
granted the Government’s motion to compel and found the 
Corporation to be in contempt, concluding (1) that even a one-
person corporation cannot assert a Fifth Amendment privilege 
regarding corporate documents, and (2) the subpoena was not 
overbroad in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The Court 
found the Corporation to be in civil contempt, and entered a 
sanction of $2,000 per day, which it ordered stayed pending 
the outcome of this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 
 6 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s decision to 
quash a grand jury subpoena for abuse of discretion.  In re 
Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2001).  In so doing, we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal rulings 
and clear error review of its factual determinations.  In re 
Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
III. 
 
A. The Subpoena Does Not Violate Doe’s Fifth 
 Amendment Rights 
 
 The subpoena requires Doe, in his capacity as custodian 
for his Medical Practice, to produce potentially incriminating 
information.  There is no dispute that, ordinarily, corporations 
like the Medical Practice are not entitled to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.  Nor is 
there any dispute that custodians of records for corporate 
entities are, typically, not entitled to invoke the privilege.  
Nonetheless, Appellants emphasize that, as a sole practitioner 
in a corporation with no other employees, Doe alone has 
control over the content and location of business records.  
They argue that, as a result, a jury will inevitably conclude that 
he produced any incriminating documents, and that the 
subpoena therefore violates his Fifth Amendment rights.  
Because we disagree, we conclude that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion by refusing to quash the subpoena on 
this ground. 
 
 Supreme Court Precedent 
 Appellants’ argument primarily hinges on two Supreme 
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Court cases: Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), and 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).  In Bellis, the 
Supreme Court held that a partner in a law firm could not 
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to avoid a subpoena seeking partnership records.  
417 U.S. at 87.  In so holding, the Court noted its “long line of 
cases” adhering to the collective entity doctrine, which states 
that “an individual cannot rely on the [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege to avoid producing the records of a collective entity 
which are in his possession in a representative capacity, even 
if these records might incriminate him personally.”  Id. at 88.  
“Since no artificial organization may utilize the personal 
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the Court 
found that it follows that an individual acting in his official 
capacity on behalf of the organization may likewise not take 
advantage of his personal privilege.”  Id. at 90.  The Court 
noted its “consistent view that the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination should be ‘limited to its historic 
function of protecting only the natural individual from 
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or 
personal records.”  Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 
U.S. 694, 701 (1944)). 
 
  Despite the Court's holding in Bellis, Appellants 
emphasize a particular paragraph from the decision, stating 
that the “[Fifth Amendment] privilege applies to the business 
records of the sole proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to 
personal documents containing more intimate information 
about the individual’s private life.”  Id. at 87-88.  They assert 
that the Court intended to distinguish between a partnership 
involving multiple individuals, and a solo practice such as the 
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Corporation, where Doe, alone, has control over the content 
and location of the business records.  This is incorrect. 
 
 In fact, as the Government argues, and as the remainder 
of the opinion makes clear, the Court, in the paragraph in 
question, is referring to unincorporated solo practitioners and 
sole proprietors.  After noting that individuals such as sole 
practitioners may claim the privilege, the Court states, “on the 
other hand,” that custodians of records of a collective entity 
may not rely on the Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid 
production they are required to make in their representative 
capacity of that entity.  Id. at 88.  As the Court explained, “In 
view of the inescapable fact that an artificial entity can only 
act to produce its records through its individual officers or 
agents, recognition of the individual’s claim of privilege with 
respect to the financial records of the organization would 
substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the 
organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth 
Amendment privilege.”  Id. at 90.  Thus, the Court drew a line 
between incorporated and unincorporated persons, not 
between solo practitioners and multi-member corporations. 
 
 Nor is there merit to Doe’s argument that, as a sole 
practitioner, the Corporation is merely his alter ego.  The 
petitioner in Bellis had also asserted that due to the modest 
size of his partnership, it was unrealistic to consider the firm 
as an entity independent of its three partners.  Soundly 
rejecting this argument, the Court emphasized that the size of 
the organization was immaterial, noting that “we do not 
believe the Court’s formulation . . . can be reduced to a simple 
proposition based solely on the size of the organization.  It is 
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well settled that no privilege can be claimed by the custodian 
of corporate records, regardless of how small the corporation 
may be.”  Id. at 100 (emphasis added). 
 
 Somewhat presciently, the Court largely dismissed the 
distinction between professional associations and partnerships 
for Fifth Amendment purposes, noting that  
 
[e]very state has now adopted laws permitting 
incorporation of professional associations, and 
increasing numbers of lawyers, doctors, and 
other professionals are choosing to conduct 
their business affairs in the corporate form 
rather than the more traditional partnership.  
Whether corporation or partnership, many of 
these firms will be independent entities whose 
financial records are held by a member of the 
firm in a representative capacity.  In these 
circumstances, the applicability of the privilege 
should not turn on an insubstantial difference in 
the form of the business enterprise.  
  
Id. at 100-01.  In so doing, the Court placed professional 
associations and partnerships on equal footing and took for 
granted that, assuming aspects of the corporate form were 
respected, the Fifth Amendment privilege would be 
unavailable to custodians of such entities. 
 
 It is therefore clear that, in applying the collective entity 
doctrine, it is not the size or the type of corporation that 
matters.  Rather, as the Supreme Court has explained, to 
 10 
determine whether an individual is entitled to invoke his or her 
Fifth Amendment privilege, courts must determine whether 
the entity in question is “an established institutional identity 
independent of its individual partners,” and not merely a loose 
informal association or some temporary arrangement.  Id. at 
95-96.  The corporation must “maintain a distinct set of 
organizational records, and recognize rights in its members of 
control and access to them.”  Id. at 93. And finally, “the 
records subpoenaed must in fact be organizational records held 
in a representative capacity,” such that it is “fair to say that the 
records demanded are the records of the organization rather 
than those of the individual.”  Id.  Here, there is no serious 
dispute that the Medical Practice, established as a professional 
association in 1973 and operating as such for over forty-one 
years, possesses an institutional identity independent of Doe 
and maintains business records that, in no way, constitute 
Doe’s personal papers.  Bellis, therefore, undermines rather 
than supports Appellants’ position. 
 
 Appellants next rely on Braswell v. United States, 487 
U.S. 99 (1988).  There, the petitioner, Braswell, was president 
and sole shareholder of two corporations.  He also served as 
those corporations’ custodian of records.  The corporations 
each had only three directors, and Braswell argued that they 
were so small, they constituted nothing more than his alter 
egos.  Applying this logic, he attempted to resist a subpoena 
by invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  Specifically, Braswell relied on the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 
(1976), and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), in 
which the Court had seemingly strayed from the collective 
 11 
entity rule and recognized that the “act of producing evidence 
in response to a subpoena has communicative aspects of its 
own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced.  
Compliance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence 
of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the 
[individual producing them].”  Braswell, 487 U.S. at 103 
(quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410). 
 
 Unlike the collective entity doctrine, which states that 
the contents of the subpoenaed business records are not 
privileged, the so called act-of-production doctrine is less 
concerned with the nature of the entity that owns the 
documents, and more concerned with the communicative or 
non-communicative nature of the disclosures sought to be 
compelled.   Id. at 102, 109; see also United States v. Hubbell, 
530 U.S. 27, 49 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (act-of-
production doctrine “provides that persons compelled to turn 
over incriminating papers or other physical evidence pursuant 
to a subpoena duces tecum or a summons may invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a bar to 
production only where the act of producing the evidence 
would contain ‘testimonial’ features.”).  Braswell argued, as 
Appellants do here, that because only he had any authority 
over the business affairs of the corporations, the very act of 
producing documents contained testimonial aspects regarding 
the existence and authenticity of the documents produced.  
Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101-02. 
 
 The Supreme Court rejected Braswell’s arguments in 
favor of a robust application of the collective entity rule, and 
again declined to carve out an exception to the rule based on 
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the size of the corporation.  As it had done in Bellis, the Court 
noted the collective entity rule’s “lengthy and distinguished 
pedigree.”  Id. at 104.  “[P]etitioner has operated his business 
through the corporate form, and we have long recognized that, 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other 
collective entities are treated differently from individuals.”  Id.  
After conducting a brief survey of cases in this area, the Court 
reaffirmed that the “plain mandate of these decisions is that 
without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the 
corporation, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as a 
custodian, a corporate custodian such as petitioner may not 
resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.”  Id. at 109. 
 
 The Court in Braswell did, however, caution that 
“certain consequences flow from the fact that the custodian’s 
act of production is one in his representative rather than 
personal capacity.”  Id. at 117.  The Government is therefore 
prohibited from making any evidentiary use of the “individual 
act” against the custodian.  This is because when the custodian 
produces documents pursuant to a subpoena issued to the 
corporation, he or she acts as a representative, and the act is 
deemed one of the corporation, not the individual.  Id. at 118.  
It is permitted, however, to use the corporation’s act of 
production against the custodian.  Id. 
 
 As evidenced by its opinions in Bellis and Braswell, the 
Court has been steadfast in its conclusion that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable 
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to corporate custodians.1  Having taken advantage of the 
benefits of incorporation for over forty years, Doe may not 
discard the corporate form simply because he now finds it 
desirable to do so.  See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 88 (noting that it is 
of no import that the custodian, in producing corporate records 
that are in his possession in a representative capacity, may also 
personally incriminate himself). 
 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s broad, and largely 
unqualified, ruling in Braswell that corporate custodians may 
not claim a Fifth Amendment privilege, it did, in a footnote, 
leave open the question of “whether the agency rationale 
supports compelling a custodian to produce corporate records 
when the custodian is able to establish, by showing for 
example that he is the sole employee and officer of the 
corporation, that the jury would inevitably conclude that he 
produced the records.”  Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118 n.11.  But 
whatever circumstances were contemplated by the Court, this 
                                                 
1 Appellants argue that the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated an increasing proclivity to extend a greater 
degree of protection to corporate entities.  See, e.g., Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).  
Whatever merit there may be to Appellants’ general 
observation, we discern nothing in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence that suggests the Court has, in any way, 
signaled its readiness to depart from its longstanding 
precedent regarding corporate custodians’ inability to invoke 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.    
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footnote in no way detracts from its holding that a custodian 
may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on the ground 
that the act of production might incriminate him.  Id. at 119. 
 
 Moreover, we express serious doubt as to whether 
footnote 11 in Braswell even applies to Doe’s situation.  It is 
hard to imagine a jury “inevitably” concluding that he 
produced the records when the records were created while the 
Corporation employed other staff besides Doe and while he 
utilizes the services of independent contractors whose 
responsibilities include “[m]aint[aining] accurate and complete 
medical records, kept in accordance with HIPAA and Patient 
Privacy standards” and assisting with billing practices.  (App. 
187.) 
 
 Third Circuit Precedent 
 
 Appellants further rely on our decisions in In re Grand 
Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) 
and Matter of Special Federal Grand Jury Empanelled 
October 31, 1985 Impounded, 819 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1987).  But 
these decisions predate the Supreme Court’s ruling in Braswell 
and do not adequately consider the collective entity rule’s 
application. 
 
 In In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), we interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Fisher and Doe as “mak[ing] the 
significant factor, for the privilege against self-incrimination, 
neither the nature of the entity which owns the documents, nor 
the contents of the documents, but rather the communicative 
or noncomunicative nature of the arguably incriminating 
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disclosures sought to be compelled.”  Braswell, 487 U.S. at 
109 (quoting In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d at 
528)).  Our decision in Matter of Special Federal Grand Jury 
Empanelled October 31, 1985 Impounded relied on our Brown 
decision and similarly applied this reasoning.  819 F.2d at 58. 
 
 The Supreme Court disagreed.  While acknowledging 
that Fisher and Doe “embarked upon a new course of Fifth 
Amendment analysis,” it rejected the notion suggested by our 
precedent that such analysis “rendered the collective entity 
rule obsolete.”  Braswell, 487 U.S. at 109.  Rather, it 
concluded that “the agency rationale undergirding the 
collective entity decisions, in which custodians asserted that 
production of entity records would incriminate them 
personally, survives.”  Id.  As a result, to the extent our 
precedents suggest that the act-of-production doctrine 
somehow rendered the collective entity rule inferior or 
obsolete, they were overruled by the Court’s decision in 
Braswell. 
 
 Precedent From Other Circuits 
 
 Our conclusion today comports with precedent from 
several other circuits that have considered the issue, all of 
which have agreed that a corporate custodian may not refuse to 
comply with a subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds merely 
because he or she is also that corporation’s sole owner and 
employee.  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued June 18, 
2009, 593 F.3d 155, 158-59 (2d Cir. 2010); Amato v. United 
States, 450 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Stone, 
976 F.2d 909, 912 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029 
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(1993). 
 
 As the Second Circuit aptly explained, this result is the 
“sensible” one. 
 
First, it prevents the erosion of the unchallenged 
rule that the [corporation] itself is not entitled to 
claim any Fifth Amendment privilege.  Second, 
it recognizes that the decision to incorporate is 
freely made and generates benefits, such as 
limited liability, and burdens, such as the need 
to respond to subpoenas for corporate records. 
Third, it avoids creating a category of 
organizations effectively immune from 
regulation by virtue of being beyond the reach 
of the Government's subpoena power. 
 
 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Issued June 18, 2009, 593 
F.3d at 158-59 (quotation marks and internal citation omitted) 
(alteration in original).  Indeed, as the Fourth Circuit noted, a 
one-person operation “is still a corporation, a state law-
regulated entity that has a separate legal existence from [the 
target of the subpoena] shielding him from its liabilities.  The 
business could have been formed as an unincorporated sole 
proprietorship and production of its business records protected 
by the privilege against self-incrimination.”  Stone, 976 F.2d at 
912.  But the individual, like Doe here, instead “chose the 
corporate form and gained its attendant benefits, and we hold . 
. . that he cannot now disregard the corporate form to shield 
his business records from production.”  Id.  Given that we find 
Appellants have advanced no persuasive rationale as to why 
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the reasoning of Bellis and Braswell does not apply to one-
person corporations like that operated by Doe, we hold that the 
collective entity doctrine applies to the Medical Practice, such 
that Doe may not rely on the Fifth Amendment to avoid 
compliance with the subpoena.2      
                                                 
2 Appellants argue that, in accordance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hubbell, 530 
U.S. 27 (2000), they do not have to comply with the subpoena 
because Hubbell recognized that compelled production of 
documents can be testimonial to the extent the production 
communicates statements of fact.  See Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 
36.  Appellants assert that because the Government’s 
document requests require him, as custodian, to identify 
sources of information, the document requests are more akin 
to an interrogatory or oral deposition.  Such production, they 
continue, violates Doe’s Fifth Amendment.  This 
misconstrues the Court’s decision.  First, there is no reason to 
suspect that Hubbell altered, in any way, the analysis set forth 
in Braswell.  The Supreme Court did not mention, much less 
revisit, the collective entity rule and cited Braswell only in a 
footnote for the proposition that the act of producing 
subpoenaed documents may have some protected testimonial 
aspects. 
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B. The Subpoena is Not Overbroad in Violation of the 
 Fourth Amendment 
 
 Appellants also argue that the subpoena was overbroad 
and lacked particularity, in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment “provides protection 
                                                                                                             
Second, Hubbell’s recognition that a custodian’s act of 
production may contain protected testimonial aspects is not 
necessarily at odds with Braswell.  The Braswell Court 
recognized the testimonial aspect of the act of production, but 
found it an insufficient basis to override the longstanding 
principle that corporate custodians are not entitled to resist a 
subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment grounds.  
See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 112 (concluding that although 
Bellis did not focus on the testimonial aspect of the act of 
production, “such a focus would not have affected the results 
reached” because it is “well settled that no privilege can be 
claimed by the custodian of records.”) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  And, in an effort to safeguard 
the these protected testimonial aspects, the Court placed 
certain evidentiary limitations on the Government to prevent 
it from using the custodian’s act in a subsequent criminal 
proceeding against him or her.  See id. at 117-18.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Hubbell does not provide a 
justification for Doe’s refusal to comply with the subpoena.  
See also Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 
2006) (rejecting “any suggestion that Hubbell so undermined 
Braswell that we are no longer compelled to follow its 
holding.”).     
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against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its 
terms to be regarded as reasonable.”  United States v. Dionisio, 
410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973).  However, the Supreme Court, in 
remarking on the “unique role in our criminal justice system” 
that the grand jury occupies, has noted that as a “necessary 
consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints 
with a broad brush.”  United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 
U.S. 292, 297 (1991).  Moreover, grand juries’ powers must be 
broad, given that “the Government cannot be required to 
justify the issuance of a grand jury subpoena by presenting 
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause because the 
very purpose of requesting the information is to ascertain 
whether probable cause exists.  Id. 
 
 Here, citing no case law, Appellants seek to cast the 
subpoena as overly broad because it “sweeps within its 
purview documents and information with no possible nexus to 
the stated investigation.”  (App. Br. at 34.)  They argue that its 
request for information relative to third parties having nothing 
to do with the OTE is impermissible.  We disagree.   The 
Supreme Court has cautioned that “the law presumes, absent a 
strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within 
the legitimate scope of its authority.”  R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 
U.S. at 300-01.  And, where a subpoena is challenged on 
relevancy grounds, as Appellants do here, “the motion to 
quash must be denied unless the district court determines that 
there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials 
the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the 
general subject of the grand jury's investigation.”  Id. at 301.  
As the District Court noted, arrangements between the 
professional association and third parties could be disguised 
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kickbacks and patients’ records might reflect that blood 
specimens had been impermissibly ordered or taken.  Under 
these circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that the category of materials 
identified in the subpoena could reasonably produce 
information relevant to the Government’s investigation. 
 
IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District 
Court’s order entered on November 20, 2014. 
